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     1 Introduction
To date, the e⁄ect of the forward market on an output market is controversial. By study-
ing the strategic motive for precommitting, Allaz and Vila (1993) have demonstrated
that a contract stage taking place before the output market, yields pro-competitive ef-
fects in Cournot setting. Once forward trading is allowed, pro￿t maximizing producers
pre-commit to obtain leadership advantages. As long as contracts are binding and observ-
able by competitors, they are used to signal Stackelberg attitudes in the output market.
However, although one-sided precommitments would e⁄ectively give a Stackelberg ad-
vantage, two-sided ones do not. Since everybody pre-commits, each producer becomes
more aggressive in the product market, and no one succeeds in acquiring an e⁄ective lead-
ership. Here stands the prisoner￿ s dilemma e⁄ect. Contracts reduce mark-up, increase
production thus leaving producers worse-o⁄. These results are challenging, especially
for strategic industries, as for instance electricity and gas markets, where on one side,
concentration is a main concern and, on the other, several forms of forward contracts
exist (either physical or ￿nancial, exchanged in standardized marketplaces or over the
counter).
From Allaz and Vila (1993, henceforth AV) on, the reliability of the setting and the
robustness of related ￿ndings have been questioned to various extent. Models that endo-
genize capacity choice (Adilov, 2005), alter competition modes by using supply function
(Green, 1999) or exclude observability of players￿actions (Hughes and Kao, 1997) have
shown that market players may be reluctant in trading forward when the participation is
voluntary. In these frameworks, the pro-competitive e⁄ect of contracts does not realize.
Green (2003) has proved that risk-averse retailers soften the prisoner￿ s dilemma type of
e⁄ect and limit competition in the output market. Finally, Mahenc and Salanie (2004)
have argued that the use of pre-commitments by Bertrand producers favours the upsurge
of market power and forward trading becomes an anti-competitive device. Despite the
progress made,1 several aspects of spot-forward interactions remain to be investigated.
This note concerns the e⁄ectiveness of forward contracts as mitigating devices in indus-
tries where one ￿rm has a ￿rst-mover advantage over its competitors in the output market,
an issue that has not been addressed so far by the literature. Our analysis is of interest
as long as Stackelberg-like market structures may exists for several reasons. For instance,
Etro (2008) notices that exogeneity of the leadership "can be a realistic description for
markets with established dominant ￿rms or where entry at an earlier stage was not pos-
sible for technological or legal reasons, for liberalized markets that were once considered
natural monopolies or those where intellectual property rights play an important role".
To take into account pre-existing strategic advantage of the dominant ￿rm, we slightly
alter AV setting, by assuming that the follower has to recover some exogenous sunk cost.
This hypothesis proves useful to understand whether the leader has incentives to engage
in predatory practices.(i.e. to expand its production up to the point where the follower
does not recover ￿xed costs).
We show that forward markets are exposed to monopolization of a unique active mar-
ket player, an innovative result neglected by existing theoretical models but for example
claimed by competition authorities monitoring forward trades in energy markets.2 The
1Some experimental and empirical support to AV￿ s predictions is in Wolak (2002), Le Coq & Orzen
(2006), Brandts et al. (2008). For a detailed description of the literature from AV on, see Bonacina et
al. (2008).
2See the analysis on gas and electricity markets in EC-DG Competition (2007).
1asymmetric timing in the output market corresponds to an asymmetric behavior in the
forward stage. Despite this monopolization, Stackelberg competition with contracts leads
to a higher consumer surplus and under some assumption on demand and costs, it may
be Pareto superior to the same situation without forward trading. Contracts cause a
redistribution of pro￿ts from the leader to the follower such that the ￿rst-mover advan-
tage vanishes. To counteract the pro-competitive e⁄ect of forward contracts, the leader
can intervene in the contract market to exclude the rival from the product market. In
this context, limit pricing - in the sense of Bain (1949a,b) - can occur. However, there
is an essential - non trivial - prerequisite to this strategy: the Stackelberg producer has
to strengthen its strategic advantage and extends its leadership position to the contract
market. If this condition is met, the leader might monopolize both the spot and the
contract markets, depending on the technological structure of the industry. Interestingly,
we prove that even in this scenario, forward contracts improve consumer surplus with
respect to the standard Stackelberg game.
Although de facto forward contract might become a barrier to entry, our results di⁄er
from Aghion and Bolton (1987) for two main reasons. First, both players can freely
contract forward and if they don￿ t, this is due to pro￿t maximizing rules and strategic
interactions. Second, as long as one player is active in the forward market, no matter
whether the leader or the follower, consumers surplus always increases with respect to
the standard game without contracts.
This note is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and derives Stackelberg
equilibria with and without forward markets. Section 3 discusses the conditions for (and
limits to) predatory conducts and investigates the related e⁄ects. Final remarks are in
Section 4.
2 Stackelberg leadership with simultaneous forward
contracting game
We consider a duopolistic industry (i.e. i = 1;2) supplying a homogeneous commodity
(qi) in a sequential mode. Competition is in quantity and one of the ￿rms move ￿rst by
choosing its production level before the competitor. We use the downscript l to denote
the Stackelberg leader and the downscript f for the follower.
Agents are risk neutral and perfectly informed; demand is linear (p = a￿qf ￿ql where
a > maxfcig). Production cost functions are heterogeneous and linear in their argument
(Ci(qi) = ciqi + F 2
i where i = l, f, ci > 0, Fl = 0 and Ff ￿ 0). Notice that we slightly
alter the AV setting by assuming asymmetric marginal cost and introducing a sunk cost
paid by the follower to enter the market.
Given pro￿ts ￿i = pqi ￿ Ci(qi), it is straightforward to demonstrate that the Stack-












We assume that sunk costs Ff are such that the Stackelberg equilibrium realizes (i.e.
it is strictly preferred to standard limit pricing and gives non-negative payo⁄s):
￿f(qs
l;qs




2where ￿ = cl ￿ cf measures the e¢ ciency gap. Results are obtained for generalized
production e¢ ciencies (i.e. ￿ may be both positive or negative).
The Stackelberg game whose outcome is given by (1), under the condition (3), serves
as a benchmark to assess whether contracts modify production by the leader and the
follower, as well as the commodity price. To this end, we add a forward stage as in AV.
The sequential structure of the production stage does not extend to the contract market
where duopolists interact simultaneously: the follower has the same right to contract as
the leader.
The full game consists of the following sequence of moves:
1. in the ￿rst stage, each duopolist chooses its trading position, fl and ff;
2. in the second stage, the leader sets ql;
3. in the last period, the follower chooses qf.
The game is solved by backward induction and results are obtained for the physical
delivery of the underlying commodity.
Proposition 1. Sequential interaction in the output market leads to monopolization of
the forward market by the follower.
Proof. Players set their optimal trading position (i.e. f￿
i ) by anticipating the pro￿t
maximizing - sequentially selected3 - output levels. Therefore in the production stage,
where forward variables (i.e. the contract price, P, and the trading positions fi) are ￿xed
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where ￿ = qs
f ￿ff ￿fl. Equation (5) gives the equilibrium quantities in the second stage
game as a function of contracts coverage, and qs
f;qs
l are de￿ned by (1). Moving backward
to the contract market, excluding arbitrage pro￿ts (i.e. p = P) and resolving for the
pro￿t maximizing contract coverage, we obtain the forward quantities at equilibrium (f￿
l
and f￿
f) and, by substitution in (5), the related production levels￿(q￿
l and q￿
f). Formally
the symmetric maximization problem is
fi = argmax
fi
f￿i (~ qf; ~ ql)g i = l;f ; (6)
and resolving the system of FOCs we get
f￿










if sunk costs are moderate (i.e. if f￿
f ￿ 2Ff), and
f￿
l = 0 , f￿
f = a ￿ cf + 2￿ ￿ 4Ff , q￿
f = 4qs
f ￿ 3Ff and q￿
l = 2(Ff ￿ ￿) (8)
3Stackelberg competition realizes in the spot market.
3if they are high (i.e. if f￿
f < 2Ff).
Consistently with AV, once the forward game is set up, strategic motives explain the
participation to forward markets. The follower commits to recover some market share
and to obtain a Stackelberg-like advantage in the output market. The leader￿ s behavior,
instead, di⁄ers from what AV would have predicted: no contract coverage, thus yielding
asymmetric commitments and monopolization of forward markets. Given the sequential
structure of the game, the ￿rst-mover anticipates the pro-competitive potential of trading
(i.e. @Q=@fi > 0 8i) and sustains output market prices by giving up forward transac-
tions. This result is challenging to the extent that although everybody can commit, the
second-mover only does so, becoming more aggressive in the product market and thus
counterbalancing the leadership of the competitor.
Notice that high ￿xed costs decrease follower￿ s contracts and production but in any
case the follower is the only participant to the trading game (f￿
l = 0, f￿
f > 0). The
monopolization of the contract market is a new issue in the literature on forward-spot
interactions but it does not exclude positive e⁄ects: contracts increase consumer surplus
and lower mark-ups. The issue is formalized in Corollary (1).
Corollary 1. Stackelberg competition with contracts always yields a higher consumer
surplus and may be Pareto superior to the same without forward trading.













f = f(a ￿ cf + 2￿)=3 if (a ￿ cf + 2￿) ￿ 6Ff; a ￿ cf + 2￿ ￿ 4Ff oth.g, f￿
f ￿ 0
and ￿ = 5f￿
f=2 ￿ 4￿. Similarly, consumers￿surplus (CS) under Stackelberg competition
without and with forward trading are respectively as follows:
CSs =
Qs￿Qs
2 and CS￿ =
Q￿￿Q￿
2 = CSs +
f￿
f
8 ￿ ; (10)
where Q = ql + qf and ￿ = 2Qs + f￿
f=4.
The e⁄ect of pre-commitments on consumer surplus is unambiguous (f￿
f ￿ 0 is su¢ cient
to have ￿ > 0, by which CS￿ > CSs). Producers are better-o⁄ or worse-o⁄ depending




f + CS￿ > ￿s
l + ￿s
f + CSs =) ￿ ￿ ￿ > 0 : (11)
If ￿ is low enough, contracting increases total welfare.
Despite the monopolization of forward markets and the success of the second-mover
in acquiring some leadership at the production stage, we ￿nd an overall pro-competitive
e⁄ect: contracts leave consumers better-o⁄. This result is robust to the technological
structure of the industry. A quite intuitive result follows: Stackelberg competition in
quantities with commitments is Pareto superior to the same without forward trading
as long as contracts redistribute outputs to the most e¢ cient producer. Notice that a






f + 4￿ ￿ 3
4(a ￿ cl + 3￿) > 0 ) ￿ ￿ 0 ; (12)
which indicates a higher technological e¢ ciency of the follower.
As for individual pro￿ts, the following Corollary (2) applies.
4Corollary 2. Contracts decrease leader￿ s pro￿t but leave the second-mover better-o⁄.
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l and ￿￿
l = (p￿ ￿ cl) ￿ q￿
l : (13)







l and p￿ = ps ￿
f￿
f
4 < ps by which ￿s
l > ￿￿
l . (14)
Moving to the follower, we have:
￿s
f = (ps ￿ cf)qs
f ￿ F 2
f and ￿￿
f = (p￿ ￿ cf)q￿
f ￿ F 2
f (15)
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Interestingly, the monopolization of the contract market by the follower causes a
redistribution of pro￿ts which advantages the second-mover and hurts the Stackelberg
leader. This outcome realizes as the ￿rst-mover, anticipating rival￿ s behavior, is forced
to sustain the output price by moving away from the contract market and this costs him
its leadership. This result is robust to several degree of cost heterogeneity.
The uneven distribution of pro￿ts may favour predatory conducts that attempt to
exclude the follower from the output market, as we discuss in the next Section.
3 Stackelberg leadership with sequential forward con-
tracting game
We have formalized above that the Stackelberg game in quantity with contracts leave
the ￿rst-mover worse o⁄. The leader may counteract this e⁄ect by adopting predatory
practices - as it is usually claimed by competition authorities - to exclude its competitor
from the production process. This Section discusses pre-conditions to these strategies
and related outcomes.
As a preliminary remark, we notice that the setting in Section 2 rules out exclusionary
practices, as long as limit pricing does not hold. Production decisions depend on forward
contracts; hence to be successful in excluding the rival at the spot stage, the leader must
intervene the contract market, but a problem arises. At the forward stage there is no
leadership advantage. Therefore simultaneity in forward choices is su¢ cient to hinder
predatory practices. Since the leader cannot control the follower￿ s contract coverage,
exclusion is unfeasible.
An essential and tricky prerequisite to predatory practices is the extension of the
leadership advantage of the Stackelberg producer to each market. Therefore, in this
5Section the full-game￿ s sequence of moves modi￿es as follows. In the contract stage, the
Stackelberg leader chooses its trading positions, fl, which is observed by the follower
before setting ff. Similarly, in the production game, the leader sets ql before the follower
chooses qf.
Under such hypothesis, the question we ask now is whether forward contracts may
be used to exclude the rival from the production process. Predatory practices in the full
game are formalized in Proposition (2); pro￿tability considerations follow (Corollary 3).
Proposition 2. Exclusion of the follower in the output market requires monopolization
of the forward market by the leader.
Proof. Resolution is by backward induction. The reaction functions at the spot stage
equal those in (5). Therefore, turning back to the contract market and recalling that
the leader anticipates the follower￿ s best-reply (i.e. ff (fl) = (a + 2￿ ￿ cf ￿ fl)=3), we
obtain the following - ￿nite and non negative - contract coverage
f
p




f = 0 (18)








f = 0 . (19)
Therefore to blockade entry, the Stackelberg leader must participate to the forward stage
and monopolize this market.
Proposition (2) states that exclusion of the rival might be obtained throughout con-
tracts￿monopolization. Depending on demand and cost parameters, either the dominant
producer may take f
p
l and monopolizes both the output and the contract market or
accommodate the rival getting ￿￿
l, as the following Corollary points out.
Corollary 3. (Su¢ cient) If ￿ < 0, the leader participates and monopolizes the forward
market.
Proof. Participation to the contract stage is strictly preferred by the ￿rst-mover if it


















where "p is the elasticity of output market demand along the relevant interval. After
some rearrangements we obtain the following su¢ cient condition on sunk costs,






which holds when ￿ < 0.
Corollary (3) con￿rms an intuitive result: if the leader is more e¢ cient than the
follower (that is ￿ < 0) predatory practices are likely. Although strategic motives lead to
monopolization of forward trading, the operation of contract markets improves consumers
surplus, as Corollary (4) shows.
Corollary 4. Despite predatory practices, Stackelberg competition in quantities with
contracts yields a higher consumer surplus than the same without forward trading.












which always holds by Proposition (2).
64 Final remarks
Our analysis proves that the pro-competitive e⁄ect of precommitments is robust to
Stackelberg-like market structures. Contracts mitigate market power even when one
of the duopolist has a strategic advantage in the output market, increasing consumers￿
surplus. However, this comes at the cost of having a monopolization of the forward mar-
ket and increasing the pro￿t of the follower. The use of forward sales to exclude the rival
in the output market requires the leader to have a strategic advantage in the contract
market and possibly to be the most e¢ cient ￿rm. Both these result show that beside the
pro-competitive e⁄ect, the operation of the contract market is strongly a⁄ected by ￿rms￿
asymmetries, as also pointed out by Lisky and Montero (2008).
Future research in exploring the role of contracts in leader-follower games could include
the analysis of price competition with di⁄erentiated product or the extension to ￿nancial
contracts that allow the dominant ￿rm to strategically buy forward to preserve its market
power.
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